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of the Belgrade Coup
Editor & Webmaster
Leon Chame - 12/04/99
Yugoslav Associates:
- Zoran Radojicic
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- George Orwell
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- Original Sorces
- Transnational (TFF)
- Fair sources
- WSWS
March 03, 2003
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NATO's Victory
by Leon Chame
NATO's political leaders ended the war by diplomatic cunning. Of course, the prize NATO has won is control over Kosovo, a
dubious trophy at best. I wonder what was second prize?
In addition, the war has opened a deep rift inside of NATO and intensified the anti-reform
process in Russia. Along the way, it also drove U.S.-Chinese relations to the lowest level
since Nixon first met Mao. That is a large price to pay for assuming responsibility for
the Balkans. In fact, responsibility for the Balkans is not something most sane people
would want. But this much must be said: even if NATO won a booby prize, the concluding
diplomacy was a wonder to behold.
NATO has won the 1999 Serbian War. Of that there can be no doubt. There are two
questions to be asked. First, how did
it manage to win the war? Second, what are the ramifications of this victory? NATO did not win
the war militarily. It won the war with a breathtaking diplomatic performance in the last week
that was duplicitous, disingenuous, and devious--precisely what brilliant diplomacy is
supposed to be.
The issue of whether NATO won the war militarily will be debated for many years. The
question of air power's efficacy is always debated with religious zeal. In this case, the
question comes down to this: why did
Slobodan Milosevic agree to the G-8 accords during his meeting with Chernomyrdin and
Ahtisaari? Was it because he could no longer resist
militarily? Was it because the cost to Serbia of the air campaign had become
unsupportable? Was it because he felt that he had achieved all that he could achieve
militarily to that point? In other
words, did Milosevic think he was capitulating or did he think he was reaching a
satisfactory political settlement?
Certainly, the ability of Serbia's ground forces to resist a NATO invasion of Kosovo had not been degraded sufficiently to permit NATO to enter the "permissive
environment" it required.
When Serb military negotiators broke off talks on June 6, NATO forces milled about
along the Kosovo border awaiting Serb permission for NATO forces to enter. When French forces entered Kosovo a week later, they
reported formidable defenses along the Albanian-Kosovo border, and expressed relief at not
having to face them. Thus, unlike the Iraqi war of
1991, there can be no argument that
NATO's air power had defeated Serbia's ground forces in Kosovo or elsewhere. Serbia's ability
to resist NATO's entrance into Kosovo remained intact.
The next question about air power is whether it had imposed strategic and economic
costs on Belgrade that were unbearable and whether these forced Milosevic to capitulate?
This is hard to answer because, in part, it depends on what was going through Milosevic's
mind when he agreed to the G-8 terms for ending the war. But the very nature of the question we pose points us in the
direction of the answer. Since we need to wonder what
went through Milosevic's mind, it is clear we are trying to figure out the reasons for his
actions. Air power had not broken
Serbia's will, but the price may have been too high to endure, particularly when
alternatives were available them.
If this air campaign was enough to break Milosevic, then air
campaign strategists themselves have vastly underestimated the impact of air power.
The Kosovo campaign was the polar opposite of what an air campaign, in theory, required. Air power theorists have no reason to defend this
campaign and defending it undermines much of their theory.
The critical point is that the air campaign did not leave Milosevic without options.
There is no doubt that he could have endured the campaign that was underway for many
months. Milosevic did not act as he did
because the air campaign had crippled him. Milosevic acted as he did because it appeared to him
that a satisfactory diplomatic resolution was available and because he believed the
geopolitical situation had developed in an unfavorable direction. Given that the broader strategic environment was moving against him and a
diplomatic option was available, it made no sense to prolong the war.
The shift in the strategic environment was, obviously, the fall of Primakov and the increasing unreliability of Russia as Serbia's patron. The diplomatic
solution was the G-8 compromise, which was understood to differ fundamentally from the
Rambouillet accord. As the G-8 was written, Milosevic's acceptance of it did not mean a
capitulation to NATO, but the acceptance of an international peacekeeping force under UN
control, enabled by a UN Security Council resolution. Since Serbia had accepted the principle of a foreign
presence in Kosovo, but objected to a purely NATO presence, the G-8 accords seemed to
achieve Milosevic's primary objectives.
NATO, mainly the U.S. and U.K., went into action the minute Milosevic accepted the
compromise. First, NATO created a public atmosphere in which it successfully portrayed
Milosevic's acceptance of G-8 as its own victory. What began as a public relations campaign designed for domestic
consumption, was rapidly transformed into the accepted reality. In a brilliant, global
public relations campaign, the U.S. and U.K. convinced even the Serb public that Milosevic
had surrendered. Milosevic found himself trapped in a
reality created by NATO.
Behind the atmospherics, there was a defining military reality. NATO could not enter
Kosovo unless the Serbs permitted it. However, once
NATO was in Kosovo, the Serbs lost their ability to resist. NATO had to convince the Serbs
to allow it to enter Kosovo, past their frontier defenses. Once inside, Serb troops were
immediately helpless, having given up not only their terrain force multipliers, but also
having their lines of supply and communications shattered and their forces enveloped in
mobile operations. The key was to get the Serbs to permit entry.
From the collapse of the border negotiations with Serbian generals on the evening of
June 6 until the entry of NATO forces on the morning of June 13, NATO diplomats brilliantly manipulated, by completely confusing,
the situation. For example, they agreed to enable the
Security Council resolution called for by the G-8 accords. They agreed to give the UN
control over civil administration. They
agreed to extensions in the Serb pullout. They agreed to a
Russian presence in Kosovo. They agreed with everything, yet
gave away nothing. Their goal was simple: to get NATO troops into Kosovo. NATO understood
that once that was achieved, NATO would run Kosovo, regardless of agreements.
The critical part of these maneuvers was to keep the Russians under control. It was, after all, the intervention of a Russian officer that
scuttled the June 5-6 discussions. NATO knew that nothing it did would satisfy all of the
Russians. Therefore, its goal was to split the Russians into as many camps as possible and
to isolate hard liners. NATO simply had
to impress on Milosevic that the Russians were not prepared to enforce the accords they
had themselves negotiated in Bonn on May 3.
Milosevic and his generals, helpless amidst the political forces unleashed by NATO,
reached out to supportive Russian factions for help. This led to the Russian intervention
in Pristina and NATO's diplomacy's finest hour. Rather
than treating the intervention as a dangerous crisis, NATO carried on with its basic
three-part program. First, it declared the intervention unimportant, and once again, image
became reality. Second, it isolated the Russian force strategically, tactically, and
politically. Surrounding countries refused to permit overflights, NATO troops rolled
around them, and NATO's allies in the Kremlin hemmed in NATO's foes. Third, and most
important, by ignoring the Russian intervention, NATO got what it wanted: its troops
passed into Kosovo, behind the mountains and minefields that had blocked them.
Indeed, the Russian intervention actually helped NATO to get in. Serb military leaders, with misplaced confidence in
the Russian military's will to confront NATO, committed a fatal error. They permitted NATO troops to cross the border on schedule. In
fact, they were eager for NATO troops to enter, expecting a confrontation between them and
the Russian forces. This would give
Serb troops the opportunity to join with reinforced Russian troops and compel NATO to face
war or retreat. Instead, NATO used its influence in
Moscow to limit the Pristina force to a symbolic gesture. NATO then proceeded to surround,
isolate, and ignore the Russians. Russian forces at Pristina, rather than becoming the
trigger of a NATO-Russian confrontation, became benignly treated hostages. NATO forces, now deep in Kosovo, proceeded to impose
the NATO occupation that Milosevic had resisted and that the G-8 accords seemed to have
avoided. Once NATO got Serbia to allow
a "permissive" entry into Kosovo, NATO was in control.
This was brilliant diplomacy. The simple fact is
that having blundered into a war they didn't really want, without a prepared military
force or a coherent strategic plan, Clinton, Blair, Albright, Berger, Cook, Robertson and
the rest in the end ran a clinic in diplomacy. They turned a badly stalemated military operation that was going nowhere
into victory. The end game provides a textbook in the
use of diplomacy for retrieving poor strategic positions. Even more than a victory for
NATO, this was a victory for the Anglo-American coalition that drove this war.
And therein lies the tale. Everything has a cost. The
first price that NATO must pay is the victory itself. It now controls Kosovo. That is a
booby prize if there ever was one. Second,
NATO is now responsible for the stability of the whole of the Balkan peninsula. What the
Austro-Hungarians and the Turks found undigestible NATO will now try to digest. On the bright side, NATO now has a full-time mission to keep
digesting it.
NATO's greatest price will be paid in NATO itself.
Gerhard Schroeder has tried to put a good face on it, but the Germans were and remain
appalled by the risks the Anglo-Americans forced Germany to accept in relation to the
Russians. After Kosovo, a compliant Germany within NATO simply
should not be taken for granted any longer.
The Kosovo affair carries with it another price: it has intensified the process in
which reformers are losing out to communists and nationalists. Kosovo was beyond Russia's reach. There are areas that are very much within its
reach, such as the Baltics, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. NATO
has established a precedent: it
can intervene in other countries so long as human rights issues justify it. Human rights
violations abound in the former Soviet Union. As hard liners inexorably increase their
power in the Kremlin, NATO will have provided them with full justification for
intervention in areas where they have the upper hand and NATO is without options. If
suffering humanity is a justification for war, NATO just gave Russia the moral basis for
reclaiming its empire.
While Russia and China have, for the past few years, been talking about forming a
strategic alliance to counterbalance U.S. hegemony, the conflict in Kosovo has driven the two countries together at an
unprecedented pace. On June 14, Russian First Deputy
Defense Minister Nikolai Mikhailov said that the Kosovo conflict prompted Moscow to
strengthen Russia’s defensive power and look for strategic partners. Mikhailov said
these partners are India and China. Russia and China, neither able to confront the U.S.
alone, were already moving toward a strategic alliance. Kosovo
provided a catalyst that should facilitate the establishment of a formal alliance between
Moscow and Beijing in the very near future.
On June 22, Moscow agreed to sell 72
Sukhoi Su-30 fighter bombers to China.
This unprecedented sale of front line equipment marks the culmination of a process
underway for the past few years – the process of Russia and China coming together to
oppose U.S. global hegemony. With the sale of these top
of the line aircraft, and an agreement in the works to allow China to produce an additional 250 Su-30s under license, Russia not only confirms
its acceptance of China as more ally than potential foe, but also lays the groundwork for
broad defense cooperation.
Moscow and Beijing are now openly voicing their intention to militarily counterbalance
the United States. The two countries have already taken
practical steps toward achieving their proclaimed goal. Russia will cooperate with China
in the area of military training and research and, most importantly, it will supply
Beijing with the newest military technology, including its front line fighters. Russia and China are done talking the talk. They’re now walking the walk. The alliance is
all but signed.
NATO came out of the war in Kosovo internally weaker than it went in. It was a
"victory". A few more victories like this and....
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